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Delineating Early-Modern Factions: A Unique Seventeenth Century Document 
Toby Osborne 
Durham University 
 
The focus of this essay is a single manuscript document that is at once tantalising and quite 
possibly unique. It amounts to two large sheets and is located in Oxford University’s 
Bodleian Library, amongst the Clarendon State Papers.1 While its author is unknown, his 
political preferences, as will be seen, are clear. Nor is its date of composition entirely certain, 
though internal evidence suggests sometime between 1639 and December 1640. The 
document details the alignments of the key figures of the duchy of Savoy, encompassing 
illegitimate members of the ruling House, the duchy’s elites and leading ministers, during a 
period when the ducal states descended into a civil war over control of a regency government. 
This essay - the first close discussion of this important source - will examine what the 
document reveals about Savoy at that given moment, though also about the dynamics of 
early-modern Italian political culture and, most broadly, factional politics in princely states. It 
articulates with an unparalleled clarity the complexity and multi-faceted nature of affiliations 
in ways that do not, to my knowledge, exist in any other contemporary sources. 
 Factions have long interested historians of pre-modern Europe, alongside scholars of 
other periods and disciplines: intellectual historians, political scientists and anthropologists.2  
A precise and universally agreed definition of ‘faction’ remains elusive, though historians 
have tended to agree on general qualities. Factions, we are told, were typically hierarchical 
with leaders at their apexes. While they might not have had clear rules or modes of entry, and 
might at times have had loose affiliations, they equally might have involved familial ties or 
other bonds of obligation. Factions could be driven by ideological issues, or associations with 
particular ‘policy’ problems such as religious divisions or international/foreign politics. 
However, even though such considerations might have given shape to factions at certain 
moments, it remains debatable as to whether early-modern factions were defined by them, or 
indeed whether they were stable and long-lasting; the emergence of lasting issue-driven 
groups, within princely states, arguably represented the gradual transition from factions to 
organised ‘parties’ (in a more modern sense), from the end of the seventeenth century.3 
Factions, in this historiographical framework, are means to ends, rather than ends in 
themselves, and the ends were the accumulation of economic, political and social resources, 
typically in competition with rival factions. 
While some political scientists working on factions in modern political culture have 
stressed their functional roles, especially within the frameworks of institutionalised party 
politics, early-modern factions were often taken as a sign that politics were not working 
properly; ‘faction’ was an inherently pejorative term, at least in princely states where 
affiliation to a ruler was supposed to trump other loyalties (such as to factional leaders), and 
where a prince might claim a monopoly of violence.4 To take one example, the lawyer and 
natural philosopher Francis Bacon (1561-1626), while tacitly recognising the reality of 
factions, nevertheless viewed them as a potential cause and symptom of monarchical frailty. 
In his essay, ‘Of Faction’, he observed that rulers who support factions in effect demean 
themselves to the levels of those beneath them, as happened in the French Wars of Religion.  
 
When factions are carried too high and too violently, it is a sign of weakness in 
princes; and much to the prejudice both of their authority and business. The motions 
of factions under kings ought to be like the motions (as the astronomers speak) of the 
inferior orbs, which may have their proper motions, but yet still are quietly carried by 
the higher motion of primum mobile.5 
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In effect, rulers should be transcendent and disinterested. As will be seen, Bacon’s view that 
factions were inherently dangerous to princely power where rulers themselves effectively 
became factional players, is especially relevant to regency regimes such as Savoy’s from 
1637. Since regents ruled on behalf of minor princes, their claims to power were inherently 
open to challenge and they could easily be viewed as partisan, not least when rivals might 
claim they were in fact better placed to act impartially for the interests of those minors.  
In this essay’s context, factions are thus understood as affiliations of individuals, 
typically under the guidance of leaders, who had possibly common interests or identities and 
who worked together within larger polities (in this context, princely states), against other 
factions, for the accumulation of political, social or material capital.6 Of all the secular courts 
of early-modern Italy, arguably none presents a better case study of faction that that of Savoy, 
the consequences of the duchy’s geo-strategic identity and of the place of the ruling House in 
Europe’s dynastic map. Savoy was in effect a composite state, comprising territories on both 
sides of the Alps. As was the case with other composite states, notably the Spanish monarchy, 
though also the Holy Roman Empire, power was partly refracted through different elites from 
the constituent territories. Those elites often competed for what they considered were their 
rights to the fruits of princely patronage, while on the other side of the equation, princes had 
to calculate about balancing competing interest groups from those territories. The principal 
cleavage in Savoy was between the francophone elites to the west of the Alps, and those 
Italian ones from the cisalpine territories. Following the definitive move of the Savoyard 
court to Turin in 1563, as the reconstituted Savoyard state’s new capital, after the years of 
occupation by French troops from 1536, power gradually shifted towards the Italian-speaking 
elites, a process accentuated by the treaty of Lyon (1601), when Savoy exchanged 
Francophone territories for the marquisate of Saluzzo, which had been under French control 
since the mid-sixteenth century.7 
The Savoyard states’ location, with France to one side and, from the sixteenth 
century, Spanish Italy on another, had other ramifications. For the French, the states offered a 
way into the Italian peninsula, and a potential mechanism for pressurising the Spanish, while 
the reverse was equally the case. This was certainly a challenge for Savoyard rulers: was it 
was better to support one or the other, or, with greater tactical difficulty, to play them against 
each other, given the duchy was ‘between the anvil and the hammer’ (‘tra l’incudine e il 
martello’), as the Venetian ambassador Giovanni Correr put it in a relazione of 1566?8 But 
this was not merely a position of weakness, since Savoy had geo-strategic importance 
leverage too: the French and Spanish were typically keen to retain Savoy as an ally, and this 
in turn encouraged them to seek dynastic unions with the House of Savoy (though we should 
add that the Savoys were also one of Catholic Europe’s oldest dynasties, with a suitably 
distinguished pedigree). Thus, Duke Emmanuel Philibert (reigned 1553-1580) married 
Margaret of Valois, as part of the wider Franco-Spanish peace process of Cateau-Cambrésis 
(3 April 1559). His sole surviving son, Charles Emmanuel I (reigned 1580-1630), married in 
Catherina Micaela (1567-97), one of Philip II of Spain’s two daughters, bringing with her a 
distinctly Spanish tone to the Savoyard court, and in 1619 Victor Amadeus (reigned 1630-37) 
married a Bourbon princess, Marie Christine (1606-1663).9 Samuel Guichenon (1607-64), 
author of the monumental Histoire généalogique de la Maison royale de Savoye, and official 
historiographer to Marie Christine, would in 1660 note that over the course of its 
genealogical history, the Savoyard House had furnished nine princesses for French marriages 
and had received no fewer than eleven princesses into the dynasty.10 
Cadet and illegitimate members of the House also served as dynastic resources in 
balancing France and Spain. We might look, for instance, to the salient example of Jacques 
de Savoie-Nemours (1531-1585), whose career as a cadet (his paternal grandfather was Duke 
Philip II of Savoy) did not preclude him establishing his family amongst the high French 
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aristocracy; while this semi-independence made him something of a dynastic enigma for 
Savoy, at his core he remained loyal to the family.11 The legitimate ducal Savoyard children 
proved especially important during the seventeenth century as strategic assets. In this regard, 
Duke Charles Emmanuel I was extremely fortunate, since through his marriage to Catherina 
Micaela he had five sons and four daughters. Of the sons, the three eldest, Philip Emmanuel 
(1586-1605), Victor Amadeus (1587-1637) and Philibert Emmanuel (1588-1624), were in 
1603 sent to Madrid, and while the relationship between the Savoy and Habsburgs was 
strained in the early 1600s by Charles Emmanuel’s increasingly Italian-oriented territorial 
ambitions, which potentially threatened Spanish Italy, the dynastic affinities between the two 
families generally held.12 One of those sons, Philibert Emmanuel became viceroy of Sicily, 
while one of the daughters, Margaret (1589-1655), left Italy in 1633 and was established as 
the vice-reine of Portugal, evoking Philibert Emmanuel’s role in Sicily.13 
These inter-mixed strategic and dynastic calculations had factional consequences. 
This was a context where the Savoys in effect alternated French and Spanish marriages, while 
flipping support for the two in pursuit of various territorial interests. It was also a context 
where those leading powers were determined to retain Savoy’s favour largely because of the 
duchy’s geographic importance, and were in turn willing to play the dynastic game. We can 
well-understand why there might have been clear divisions separating those who advocated 
pro-French or pro-Spanish alignments for what they might offer Savoy.14 These divisions 
were even manifested within the ruling dynasty: while Philibert Emmanuel was evidently 
groomed by his father as a point of contact with the Spanish, another son, Cardinal Maurice 
(1593-1657), followed a different path when in 1621 he was named as France’s cardinal-
protector. This can be placed in the context of the ruling House seeking to ensure members in 
both Spanish and French camps, though a potential for rivalry between the sons remained. 
Writing in 1622, for example, Venice’s ordinary ambassador in Turin, Marc Antonio 
Morosoni, reported that, ‘Somewhat sharp letters have passed between Prince Philibert and 
the Cardinal-Prince, since the one, a follower of the Catholic King [Philip IV] who is well-
treated, criticises the other that his service to the Most Christian King [Louis XIII] bears few 
advantages of note.’15 
These various factors were sharply focused during the tumultuous events that 
overtook Savoy’s ruling dynasty and states during the 1630s. On 25 September 1637, Victor 
Amadeus I attended a banquet organised by the French military commander, the duke of 
Crequy, whose forces were engaged against the Spanish as part of a Franco-Savoyard alliance 
that had been agreed in 1635. A fortnight later, the duke was dead (7 October), along with his 
leading court-minister, Augusto Manfredo Scaglia, the count of Verrua (born 1581); another 
of the duke’s military commanders, the Ferrarese condottiere marquis of Villa fell seriously 
ill, but survived. The duke left behind his wife, the Bourbon Marie Christine, and two sons, 
Francis Hyacinth (1632–38), aged five at that time, and his younger brother, the three years 
old Charles Emmanuel (1634–75). Since Francis Hyacinth was a minor, Marie Christine 
assumed responsibility for the regency. 
Against this backdrop of profound dynastic uncertainty, relations between the 
dowager duchess and her brothers-in-law, the restless and ambitious Cardinal Maurice and 
Thomas Francis, prince of Carignano (1596-1656), strained to the point of breaking. Maurice, 
the elder of the two brothers, had from 1621, as mentioned above, operated as France’s 
cardinal-protector, but in 1636 had switched to the cardinal-protectorship of the Holy Roman 
Empire. For his part, Thomas Carignano had, in April 1634, left Italy, taking a command in 
the Spanish army of Flanders. This double defection was set against a backdrop of deepening 
concern over French influence in Savoy, dating back at least to the two treaties of Cherasco 
(April and June 1631) that had concluded the War for Mantua and Monferrato; French troops, 
in defiance of the treaty, continued to occupy the Piedmontese fortress of Pinerolo.16 Quite 
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understandably, the open Habsburg alignment of the two brothers was suspected as a 
deliberate strategy on the part of the ruling family of spreading their options, though no 
unequivocal evidence supports this, and, as suggested above, some doubted Maurice’s 
constancy.17 
Almost exactly a year after Victor Amadeus’s suspicious death, the child-duke 
Francis Hyacinth was himself dead (4 October 1638); the duchy’s future thus lay with a 
single male infant, Charles Emmanuel, barely four years old and of fragile health. What had 
amounted to a cold war from October 1637, when Maurice and Thomas Carignano had just 
about accepted Marie Christine as regent, was replaced by a hot civil war over control of 
fragile infant duke, the duchess backed (somewhat reluctantly on her part) by the French 
regime, the princes supported by the Spanish. Thomas Carignano returned from the Low 
Countries to north Italy, and in March 1639 entered the Savoyard states at the head of an 
armed force, taking a series of towns and eventually occupying Turin over the summer of 
1639, and submitting the capital to a second siege in 1640. It was not until June 1642 that the 
conflict was finally settled.18 
In this civil war over control of the regency, in a state that in any case was already 
receptive to divisions because of its geo-strategic and dynastic profile, we thus have obvious 
ingredients for a factional conflict. Here, we should turn to the Bodleian document, and while 
care should be exercised about extrapolating too many broad observations from a single 
source, it nevertheless yields significant insights into early-modern factions. The document is 
in the form of a table comprising twelve columns, with explanatory text at the top and the 
bottom. Along the top of the table, the twelve columns are labelled, and are largely self-
explanatory.  The last column refers intriguingly – and importantly - to ‘true Piedmontese’, 
which resonates with the language of ‘good Piedmontese’ in the opening superscript and 
which will be discussed later. The fact that the author does not tabulate those who are anti-
Spanish as it does with the French, confirms the sense of the document’s pro-prince and anti-
French affiliations. 
The tabulation of loyalties and identities according to no fewer than twelve variables 
is striking. The only other early-modern documents that seem to approximate to this source, 
to my knowledge, are the division lists for the English Parliament, that first began appearing 
from the mid-seventeenth century, detailing the political preferences of members in the 
House of Lords in response to specific issues.19 One might also place the voting outcomes 
that were often leaked during papal conclaves, or made known afterwards, in a similar 
context, delineating, for example, those loyal to papal families, or to powerful cardinals, or to 
leading powers, such as the emperor, Spain or France.20 Nevertheless, both sets of sources 
are, by comparison with the Bodleian document, considerably more limited in their subtlety. 
A closer comparison might be found in a history of the reign of Louis XVI by the French 
scientist, diplomat and historian, Jean-Louis Soulavie (1752-1813), in which Soulavie sought 
to describe in a tabular form, with almost scientific precision, how factions during the French 
Revolution formed and dissolved like chemical compounds, though it should be added that 
Soulavie was writing with the benefit of hindsight.21 
The twelve columns in the Bodleian document clearly afford the author considerable 
nuance in detailing not only the affiliations of those listed, but also the different ways in 
which individuals might simultaneously be categorised. We might well ask which affiliation 
was the most important? As noted earlier, factional identity was often defined by loyalty to a 
leader, which the Bodleian document ostensibly confirms. Virtually all those named are 
defined as followers of Marie Christine, or of either one or both of the princes (the majority 
of those listed as followers of the elder of the two brothers, Maurice, who was closer to the 
throne by reason of his age; fewer are defined as followers of Thomas Carignano alone). 
There are only two exceptions. The papal nuncio, Fausto Caffarelli (1595-1651), bishop of 
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San Severina, who served as Urban VIII’s nuncio to Turin from 1634 until December 1640 
and who ostensibly tried to mediate in the civil war, is nevertheless listed as a partisan actor 
in the civil war, ‘disgusted with Marie Christine’, ‘of the Spanish faction’, and ‘opposed to 
the d’Agliè.22 The other is ‘P’re Monodo Gesuita, in Momiliano [Montmélian]’, clearly 
identifiable as Pierre Monod (1586-1644), the Jesuit polemicist, born in Bonneville 
(Faucigny). Monod had in the earlier-1630s played a key role in promoting Savoy’s 
monarchical credentials following the 1632 royal declaration, through his court-sponsored 
treatise, the Trattato del titolo regio (Turin, 1633). He also served on missions to France 
during the 1630s, though it was during this period that his relations with Richelieu 
deteriorated to the point that following Victor Amadeus’s death, the cardinal-minister 
pressurised Marie Christine to have Monod arrested; after attempting to flee from internal 
exile in Savoy, in January 1639 Monod was transferred to Montmélian Castle (providing a 
date from which the document was produced), a prelude to his imprisonment at Richelieu’s 
instigation in the fortress-prison of Miolans, where he remained until his death.23 According 
to the Bodleian document, Monod was opposed to Marie Christine and to both princes, he 
was disgusted with the French and adverse to the d’Agliè. His response to the civil war in 
Savoy, and to his treatment by the regency regime, under pressure from France, was one of 
pointed disengagement. 
Returning to the broader point, it seems, given the identification of all but two with 
support for either Marie Christine or the princes, that the Bodleian document confirms the 
typological conception of factions as hierarchical in structure, with leaders at their pinnacles. 
It should be reiterated that regency regimes were especially liable to faction. Regents lacked 
the intrinsic authority of reigning adult sovereigns, and by the nature of their power, they 
often found themselves challenged by others who claimed that they were better placed to 
govern on behalf of minors. Such a diminution of authority meant that regents themselves 
could easily be viewed as factional players, not least as they might depend, or be seen to 
depend, on the support of self-interested followers. This seems to have been the case with 
Marie Christine. Indeed, when Cardinal Maurice and Thomas Carignano issued, on 15 June 
1639, a manifesto justifying their claim to the regency, they explicitly noted how she had 
become subject to ambitious courtiers, even before Victor Amadeus’s death. While they 
claimed that their concern for the welfare of Savoy transcended personal interests, the same 
was not true of her regime.24 In effect, the dowager duchess was no different to a prince who, 
in Francis Bacon’s words, had become ‘also one among us [tanquam unus ex nobis]’.25 
However, the document goes well-beyond a simple Madamisti-Principisti bi-polarity, 
defined solely by loyalty to the factional leaders: the factions themselves were factionalised. 
Accordingly, the document affords for historians a more nuanced and complex picture of how 
early-modern factions worked. As implied above, the document does not lump all the 
principisti together. Loyalty to Maurice is distinguished from that to Thomas Carignano, with 
more individuals named as supporting the cardinal. During the civil war there were 
simmering tensions between the brothers, not least as Maurice’s own loyalties remained 
suspect. What is more, some individuals are named as being simultaneously obedient to 
Marie Christine and devoted to Maurice, complicating even a simplistic assumption of 
loyalty to a single factional leader (only one individual, Maurizio Capris, the governor of 
Turin’s citadel, is described as obedient to Madama and devoted to Thomas Carignano). 
Loyalty to a single member of the ruling House as a ‘leader’ might be seen as one 
way to define the factions in Savoy, but this was evidently not the case for all. Did support 
for the duchess and princes also equate to support for the French and Spanish, and might that 
have provided an alternative way to categorise identities? Certainly, Richelieu was keen to 
strengthen his grip over Marie Christine’s regency, in the classic manner of paying pensions 
to her followers.26 A similar story might possibly be told of the princes’ followers. Yet the 
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Bodleian document does not in fact assume that support for the factional leaders was 
synonymous with being in either French or Spanish factions. A significant number of Marie 
Christine’s supporters are not explicitly categorised as ‘of French faction’, while a number of 
the princes’ supporters are likewise not ‘of Spanish faction’. The only general point that 
holds is that only one person ‘obedient to Madama’ is designated as being of the Spanish 
faction (devoted also to both princes), while none of the princes’ supporters are of the French 
faction. 
 To what or whom, then, might individuals have been loyal, if not solely to factional 
leaders from the Savoyard House, or to the French or Spanish? Here, the document provides 
one potential answer. Two columns list those who either support or oppose the d’Agliè 
family. The San Martino d’Agliè were the most powerful clan attached to Marie Christine’s 
regime after Victor Amadeus’s death in 1637, though their fortunes had been on the rise for 
some time, signalled by promotions to Savoy’s sovereign chivalric order, the Annunziata. At 
Charles Emmanuel I’s sixth creation, on 18 March 1608, Niccolò san Martino d’Agliè (died 
1614) was promoted to the order; his son, Ludovico (1578-1646) was admitted at Victor 
Amadeus I’s third creation in 1636.27 Since the order had a strictly fixed membership, family 
politics at court was a zero sum game: gains made by one family, through promotions to the 
Annunziata, necessarily limited the opportunities of rivals. 
As is well-known, to the point of salacious scandal, Filippo S. Martino d’Agliè (1604-
67) was reputed, from the 1630s, to have been a lover of the duchess, evoking the kinds of 
rumours that were to surround Cardinal Mazarin’s relationship with Anne of Austria during 
her regency government in France - it was the potential danger posed to female regents with 
male favourites, underscoring again the potential that regents, and female regents in 
particular, might seem partisan. Given the influence he enjoyed with the dowager duchess, he 
probably represented the leader of the clan, its factional head.28 Three other close family 
members are mentioned in the Bodleian document: Filippo’s two surviving brothers, 
Ottaviano, the marquis of San Germano (died 1676), and Gianfrancesco (died 1678), named 
here as the ‘Abbate di Pinerolo’, in addition to their uncle, Ludovico d’Agliè, the marquis 
d’Agliè, who, as noted above, had been promoted to the Annunziata in 1636.29 All had served 
in various court offices and diplomatic missions before the civil war, and evidently they 
remained tightly organised in their affinities during the war. It is worth adding that they are 
all listed as being of the French faction, though Filippo famously was dramatically seized on 
New Year’s Day 1640, by the French and imprisoned in Valenciennes, probably because the 
French had long suspected his loyalties, as they had done with Pierre Monod. Before the 
outbreak of the civil war, Filippo had opened a secret negotiation with the Spanish governor 
of Milan, the marquis of Leganes (1580-1655), if primarily to extract greater concessions 
from the French by giving the appearance of leaning towards the Spanish (a classic Savoyard 
negotiating tactic that did little to assure Savoy’s allies).30 Filippo’s arrest also provides 
another clue for when the Bodleian document must have been written, given his description 
as ‘count Filippo d’Agliè, who governs’. 
The Bodleian document additionally reveals that the d’Agliè had supporters, notably 
the count della Monta and the abbé della Monta, along with a string of other courtiers and 
ministers. The abbé had also been in receipt of a gift from Richelieu of the returns from the 
abbey of Nante, said to be worth 3000 scudi a year.31 Tellingly, though, the document’s 
author was more than willing to mark-out several supporters with pejorative language, no 
doubt reflecting the author’s own position. President Bollone, for example, is described as a 
‘greedy and self-interested man’ (‘huomo avaro come all’interesse’), while Senator Cauda is 
marked as ‘mischievous embroiler’ (‘maligno Inbrogliatore’), both descriptions loaded with 
connotations of self-interest above loyalty to Savoy and its ruling House. Just as striking, 
though, is the level of opposition to the family expressed in the document, for which there is 
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a separate column. If we were to take this document as an accurate record, the fact that the 
majority of those named are indeed specified as being either pro- or anti-d’Agliè suggests 
how divisive the family was as a factional interest group in Savoyard court politics.  There 
was, it seems, not much middle ground for indifference. In this respect, the d’Agliè clan was 
as much the defining feature of Savoy’s factions during the civil war as Marie Christine and 
two Savoyard princes.  
How, though, does support or opposition to the d’Agliè map to loyalties to the 
duchess and princes? Again, close scrutiny reveals the absence of defining loyalties applied 
consistently to everyone: there were even principisti seemingly amongst the d’Agliè’s 
supporters. Three individuals are marked as simultaneously devoted to Maurice and friends 
or adherents of the d’Agliè, despite the family’s close association with Marie Christine’s 
regency regime, though it should at least be added that none of the d’Agliè’s supporters are 
designated members of the Spanish faction. These three nevertheless seem to be exceptions. 
The remaining named supporters of the d’Agliè’s are defined as obedient to Marie Christine. 
However, to add yet more complexity to this picture, not all of the duchess’s supporters were 
affiliated with the d’Agliè. One family, notably, had already marked itself as a rival to the 
d’Agliè: the Scaglia di Verrua, and their place in the Bodleian document adds yet another 
dimension to this factional puzzle. During Charles Emmanuel I’s reign, the Scaglia di Verrua 
were the more powerful of the two court families, quite possibly the single most powerful 
aristocratic clan in Turin. But while they had largely dominated Savoyard politics during the 
first two decades of the seventeenth century, their influence had been checked – if not 
terminally weakened – by the emergence of the d’Agliè during the 1630s, not least as Abbé 
Alessandro Scaglia (1592-1641), one of the Scaglia di Verrua’s most prominent members, 
had entered self-imposed exile in the Spanish Netherlands in 1632.32  The Scaglia di Verrua 
are named in the Bodleian document.  Carlo Vittorio Scaglia (died 1653), Alessandro’s 
nephew and head of the family House following the count of Verrua’s death in 1637 (at the 
feast organised by Crequy mentioned earlier), is listed here as the ‘conte di Verrua’, obedient 
to Marie Christine, of the French faction, and – importantly - opposed to the d’Agliè.  Further 
down, there is an entry for ‘abati di Verrua’, which probably refer to Alessandro Scaglia, 
already mentioned, and Filiberto Scaglia (died 1658), the youngest of Alessandro’s three 
nephews – the name ‘abate di Verrua’ was one used for Filiberto in the period. Alessandro’s 
elder brother, the count of Verrua, had remained in service to Victor Amadeus during the 
1630s, along with his eldest son, named as the ‘conte di Verrua’ in the Bodleian document. 
Filiberto, the third and youngest son, by contrast, left Savoy in 1636 and joined his uncle in 
the Spanish Netherlands.33 Accordingly, these two churchmen are categorised as disgusted 
with Madama, devoted to the princes, of the Spanish faction, opposed to the d’Agliè.   
All the family members clearly shared an aversion to the d’Agliè, but what might we 
extrapolate from the fact that they were seemingly on different sides of the civil war? In the 
first place, the fact that the count of Verrua could remain obedient to Marie Christine yet 
opposed to the d’Agliè reminds us that the basic conception of ‘faction’ as a collection of 
individuals defined and unified by loyalty to a leader simply does not hold. Evidently, 
individuals might share a loyalty to a leader as one facet of their identities, yet also be defined 
as much by their opposition to each other. Secondly, the document hints at a strategy a family 
might understandably use during a crisis like a dynastic civil war. While the d’Agliè family 
clearly pinned their collective fortunes to those of Marie Christine by consistent support for 
her, the Scaglia di Verrua seem to have hedged their bets by supporting both camps (just as 
the switch of Maurice and Thomas Carignano to the Habsburgs earlier in the 1630s had been 
suspected as part of a tacit strategy for placing members of the ruling House in both the 
French and Spanish camps). The surviving documentary evidence elsewhere does not provide 
an unequivocal answer to this possibility, though it was, by inference, suspected at the time.  
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The document, however, points to yet another political identity, one that was 
ideologically loaded at the time and remained charged with meanings well into the nineteenth 
century. The table’s last column lists those defined as ‘true Piedmontese’ (‘veri Piemontesi’)- 
the ‘abbés of Verrua’ among them - even if only a small number of the overall named 
individuals are actually marked out accordingly. What defined someone as ‘true 
Piedmontese’? By looking at the other characteristics of those named in this column in the 
Bodleian document, it seems that the language had a specific set of political meanings. Most 
simply, it meant being opposed to France’s involvement in Savoy. That is not to say that all 
the princes’ supporters are listed as ‘true Piedmontese’, or vice-versa; yet again, the Bodleian 
document does not afford entirely consistent political classifications. Two individuals named 
as ‘true Piedmontese’ are also listed amongst Marie Christine’s adherents: the ‘Gran 
Cancelliere, disparagingly characterised as a ‘timid man’, and the ‘destro’ Presidente 
Morozzo, presumably Count Carlo Filippo Morozzo, the first president in the Senate of 
Piedmont, and a member of a family with a long record of service to the Savoys. More 
significantly, though, neither is listed as being of the French faction, and on this point, the 
document does offer some definitional clarity.34 
Being ‘true Piedmontese’ also signified more than opposition to France alone. It 
resonates with the superscript at the beginning of the document, referring to ‘good 
Piedmontese’, and, more generally, with contemporaneous languages used in France too. The 
idea of the ‘good French’ [bon français] had a particular importance during Richelieu’s 
ministry (1624-1641), designating those who were anti-Spanish and who thus supported the 
cardinal’s policies and were loyal to the state under his ministry. Just as tellingly, those who 
opposed the cardinal sought their own labels as ‘good Catholics’ [bons catholiques], arguing 
instead that France should seek a closer alignment with their Spanish co-religionists.35 
Domestic politics during Richelieu’s ministry was partly fought on a conceptual background; 
these competing languages were short-hands for how best to conduct foreign policies and for 
support or opposition to Richelieu and his conception of state loyalty, and were used by their 
proponents to appeal to domestic and international audiences.36 Correspondingly, being ‘true 
Piedmontese’ or a ‘good Piedmontese’ was to be understood as designating a position of 
moral superiority, of being motivated not for personal gain as a factional member, but by a 
higher sense of loyalty to some kind of ‘national’ interest, however fuzzy the ‘nation’ might 
have been.37 That sense of loyalty could be sharpened at moments when Savoy was 
confronted by one of the leading powers, either France or Spain. When in March 1610 
Venice’s ordinary ambassador in Turin, Gregorio Barbarigo, reported back to the Senate a 
series of conversations he had with the duke and several leading political figures, he wrote 
that he had put it to one of them the claim that he was in receipt of a Spanish pension. 
Laughing, the official replied that he was neither pro-Spanish nor indeed pro-French, but was 
rather a ‘good Italian’.38 This conception of loyalty as something that transcended personal 
interest also resonated with another powerful conceptual language current in the early-
modern period, that of ‘Italian liberty’. During the 1610s, as Duke Charles Emmanuel I’s 
diplomatic, dynastic and territorial strategies focused on north Italy and inevitably brought 
Savoy into confrontation with Spain, Charles Emmanuel and his ministers predictably laid 
claim to this language as a way of galvanising support in Italy and further afield.39 The 
language of liberty was the obvious recourse for any Italian power during moments of 
international crisis, implying a sense of independence, of moral ‘right’ and of self-sacrifice in 
the face of foreign (that is to say Spanish) domination40, even if, in Savoy’s case, the claim 
that the duchy was defending liberty was in reality a fig leaf to cover more grubby ambitions.  
It is telling, though, that while Spain was identified as the principal threat to Savoyard 
‘independence’ in the 1610s, by the time of the civil war and the Bodleian document, France 
seems to have taken on the mantle of Savoy’s greatest external enemy, not least because of 
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Richelieu’s apparent determination during the 1630s to exert a controlling hand over the 
ducal states. As mentioned from the start, this probably reflects the partisanship of the author, 
but the point is nonetheless important. Ideas such as ‘true Piedmontese’, ‘good Italian’ and 
the ‘liberty of Italy’ were malleable; their meanings might be susceptible to change, and thus 
subject to competing interest groups seeking to claim ownership over them. Politics and 
power could be linguistically constructed, as the contributors to the influential study, Political 
Innovation and Conceptual Change (1989), argued, borrowing largely from the works of 
linguistic philosophers such as J. L. Austin, whose work on performativity is currently 
providing historians with a rich new vocabulary for interpreting the early modern period.41 It 
is tempting, certainly, to draw an obvious conclusion from the shifting target of this language. 
By the 1630s, France had supplanted Spain as the focal point of opposition for defenders of 
‘liberty’ and those who were ‘true Piedmontese’, as Spain’s power around Europe, and 
indeed the world, was beginning to wane.42 
The Bodleian document concludes with further qualitative observations that deserve 
attention. The comments referring to the supporters of Marie Christine and the d’Agliè can be 
taken as they are: clearly the document’s author knew how to besmirch his opponents, 
motivated, so he suggested, by fear or self-interest, rather than, as might be inferred, higher 
motives of principle. Equally, the author’s claim that the princes enjoyed a wider base of 
support should be treated with caution, but that last point is important, reflecting back also to 
the concluding remark in the document’s initial caption that ‘all the rest [aside from those 
listed] are good Piedmontese, who will follow the favour of the princes of the blood’. The 
precise definition of who constituted ‘the people’ is not articulated, but it might suggest the 
engagement of a wider public in the civil war. Factionalism seems fundamentally to be a 
court phenomenon, predicated on a view that the court represented the greatest concentration 
of patronage and power, but did court factions also seek or galvanise support from a wider 
nation, and if so, were such expressions of popular politics necessarily dependent on elite 
leadership? This important question is a difficult one to answer, and has been a point of 
contention for scholars of the French Wars of Religion, for example, seeking to challenge the 
boundaries between elite and popular political culture in a comparable context of rival court 
factions and civil war.43 The same scholarship is lacking for the Savoyard civil war, so it 
remains difficult to come to definitive conclusions, but some initial, albeit anecdotal, 
observations can be made. The papal nuncio, Caffarelli, who, as we have seen, was named in 
the Bodleian document as being partial to Spain, indeed reported his impression shortly after 
Victor Amadeus’s death that the Piedmontese were not inclined to the French, who were 
suspected of wishing to prolong the war in Italy against the Spanish. The English secretary in 
Turin, Peter Morton, certainly shared this impression, recording in November 1639 the 
‘irreconcilable hatred…of the generality of this people against that nation [the French]’.44 
Earlier in the year, Morton had recorded, on several occasions, the seemingly popular support 
for the princes. When, to take one example, Thomas Francis made his surprise move into 
Turin in July 1639, Morton wrote that the prince’s Piedmontese troops, “dispersed 
themselves through the streets of Turin, crying ‘viva Savoia e il Principe Tomaso’, which was 
corresponded unto by the Inhabitants in all places, as if they knew no other patron but him”.45 
It might be added that Federico Sclopis, the nineteenth century Turinese jurist and 
scholar who was instrumental in the unification of Italy, for one, had few doubts about the 
levels of popular backing for the princes. The majority of the population in Piedmont were 
principisti and thus more pro-Spanish than French for two reasons, he claimed, first because 
at that moment the French were a greater threat to the duchy’s independence, and secondly 
because of an inherent loyalty to the princes and their ostensible wish to preserve the duchy 
from foreign [French] domination.46 This particular articulation of loyalty, it seems, would 
remain lodged in Savoyard political mentality for a long time. In a parallel episode, when, at 
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the end of the 1670s, the prospect emerged of the young Duke Victor Amadeus II (reigned 
from 1675 as duke of Savoy) marrying his Portuguese cousin, sections of the Piedmontese 
nobility became vocal in their opposition to the duke leaving Savoy, and a popular 
demonstration beyond the court was mobilised in Turin against the duke leaving (though it is 
unclear as to whether this event was in fact manufactured by courtiers).47 
In drawing conclusions, it must be noted first that the Bodleian document should be 
treated with caveats. Aside from the opening and concluding remarks, it does not offer a 
narrative account of factional politics during the Savoyard civil war. On the contrary, as a 
descriptive table it presents a political snapshot, a moment rather than an extended process. 
Affiliations might change; the patterns of factions could shift, not least as individuals’ 
political fortunes waxed and waned. Yet the document provides fascinating, and important, 
insights into the politics of Savoy, and its significance as an historical source resonates more 
widely still. The very fact that affiliations were tabulated as they were marks the document 
out: it delineates in a way that seems to be entirely unique the complex gamut of responses to 
civil war, and of the flexible nature of political identity and affiliation.  In doing so, it 
encourages us to re-think factions as multi-dimensional. ‘Faction’ in the document is 
understood in three inter-related but also distinct senses, first of loyalty to a leader, whether 
Marie Christine, Cardinal Maurice and/or Thomas Carignano. These loyalties were largely, 
though not always, consistent, as some individuals were listed as adhering to more than one 
leader; at the same time, the loyalties corresponded in the second place with French or 
Spanish affiliations, though again not in every case. Lastly, though, individuals divided along 
family lines, and principally whether they supported the dominant d’Agliè clan, whose 
members were themselves defined as loyal to Marie Christine. But one’s stance towards the 
d’Agliè clearly signified something different to support for the duchess. These were clearly 
meant to designate separate definitional categories. Factions, and individuals, could thus be 
configured differently, whether they were defined according to princely leaders, to the French 
or Spanish (or neither), or the d’Agliè as a court clan. Which affiliation or identity was the 
more powerful? Could a supporter of the duchess who was nevertheless an opponent of the 
d’Agliè cooperate with that clan? What is more, the document alludes to another, arguably 
transcendent, political position, of ‘loyalty’, expressed through the language of the ‘true’ or 
‘good Piedmontese’. Therein the author offers what is arguably an alternative political 
language to faction in this civil war setting, with its pejorative connotations of partisanship. 
As we have seen, this language was not itself conceptually anchored on a single specific 
political meaning (whether it was liberty defined against either the Spanish or French), 
though it broadly implied an opposition to ‘foreign’ domination. But perhaps its application 
represents a critical conceptual junction between self-interest and principle, even if, as was so 
typical of the early-modern world, the boundaries between the two remained at best ill-
defined. 
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Cav’ri, et Ministri del Piemonte più 
considerabili, che sono, ó, contrarÿ, 
 ó, favorevoli, contrasignati con la +  
à loro luogo. Tutti gli altri sono  
buoni Piemontesi, che seguiranno il 
favore de Prencipi del Sangue 
Obbedienti a 
Madama 
Disgustati  
da Madama 
Divoti al 
S.r 
P’npe 
Card’le 
Contrarÿ 
al S.r 
P’npe 
Card’le 
Divoti al 
S.r P’npe 
Tomaso 
Contrarÿ 
al S.r 
P’npe 
Tomaso 
Disgustati 
da 
Francesi 
Di 
fattione 
Francese 
Di fattione 
Spagnuola 
Amici pare’ti 
et  
adherenti 
alli d’Agliè 
che 
governano 
Avversarÿ 
alli d’Agliè 
Veri  
Piemontesi 
 
Marchese Villa ritenuto 
dall’interesse 
    +                  +   
Co’ Filippo d’Agliè che 
governa 
    +          +           +          +      
Marchese S. Germano fra’llo 
del sud.o  
              +          +       +          +      
Abbate di Pinarolo fra’llo de 
sud.i 
              +          +       +          +      
Marchese d’Agliè zio de sud.i               +          +       +          +      
Marchese di Bagnaseco Cav.re 
di fattione, et di seguito bravo, 
e temuto 
         +      +          +            +             +           +   
Conte di Druent cugnato del 
sud.o 
         +      +          +               +   
Presid.te Ruffia, parente de 
sud.i 
                 +               +           +   
Marchese di Ciriè, cugnato del 
Villa 
       +                            +   
Conte Ardoino Valperga               +                   +   
Marchese Pallavicino             +               +           +   
Conte di Verzuolo               +             
SS.ri della Manta        +           
Conte della Montà               +          +       +          +             +    
Abbate della Montà               +          +       +          +             +    
Conte d’Arignano          +      +                 +   
Conti di Moretta        +                 +   
Conte di Verua               +               +            +   
Conti di None               +             
Marchese di Pianezza               +       +                 +   
D. Felice di Savoia               +             
D. Mauritio               +        +                 +   
D. Carlo Umberto naturale        +          +               +   
D. Vittichindo naturale        +          +               +   
D. Carlo Opperto               +                    +    
C. Agostino della Lanze      +          +                 +           
Marchese di Dogliani     +                                           +  
 
Cav’ri, et Ministri del Piemonte più 
considerabili, che sono, ó, contrarÿ, ó  
favorevoli, contrasignati con la + à 
loro luogo. Tutti gli altri sono buoni 
Piemontesi, che seguiranno il favore 
de Prencipi del Sangue 
Obbedienti a 
Madama 
Disgustati  
da Madama 
Divoti al 
S.r 
P’npe 
Card’le 
Contrarÿ 
al S.r 
P’npe 
Card’le 
Divoti al 
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Conte di Cumiana               +                                        +    
Carlo Passerano               +             
Marchese Florì               +                       +      
Marchese di Caraglio               +             
Co. Carlo Castellamonte 
Ingigniero 
              +             
Principe di Messerano        +                 +           +   
Barone d’Allamagna               +                    +    
Marchese Bobba               +          +           +                         +   
Abbati d’Verua          +      +          +               +           +     +  
Nuntio          +                  +           +       
Co. Gio. Fran.co Carretto fr’t’o 
di Bagnaseco 
         +      +                 +   
S.r D’Enuie               +       +           
Sig.r di Parella               +       +                 +   
Caprio Gov.re della Cittadella 
di Torino 
              +       +          +         
Sig.r di Santena          +                  +   
Commend.re Balbiano             +               +   
Ss.ri Broglia        +                 +   
Marchese Clavesana        +                 +           +   
Marchese Forno               +                   +   
Conte di Collegno               +       +                  +    
Archivescovo di Torino               +       +                  +    
Conte di Frossasco               +             
Gran Cancelliere huomo timido               +                   +     +  
P.o Presid.te Bellone huomo 
avaro come all’interesse 
              +              +              +    
Presid.te Benzo, huomo 
maligno saputo il Genero è 
suddito di S. M. Cat.ca  - [?] 
d’Agliano 
              +          +           +                 +            +   
Presid.te Morozzo, destro               +                       +  
Presid.te Humolio ostinato               +       +           
Presid.te Duchi dolce        +          +           +  
 
     Cav’ri, et Ministri del Piemonte pi  
considerabili, che sono, ó, contrarÿ, ó  
favorevoli, contrasignati con la + à 
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Presid.te Cauda maligno, 
ignorante 
             +         +           +          +           +         
Presid.te Ferraris huomo 
d’essecu.ne 
           +          +           +  
Presid.te Frino interessato               +       +          +                            +     
Presid.te Richelmi, maligno                          +                 +      
P’re Monodo Gesuita, in 
Momiliano 
                       +         +           +           +                        +   
Presid.te Pellegnino, uscito di 
Piem.te 
         +                             +  
P.o segr’io Pasero, uscito di 
Piem.te 
         +      +          +               +           +     +  
Il Conte Messarati, uscito di 
Piem.te 
         +      +          +               +           +         +  
Il Seg.rio Carone               +               +           +          +             +             
San Tomaso seg’rio, figlio del 
sud.o 
              +               +           +          +             +             
Claretti seg’rio, destro          +      +                         +           +   
Dionigi Meÿner seg’rio               +               +           +         
Sena.re Barberis Maligno          +         +          
Sen.re Silanis maligno               +                 +           +                          
Sen.re Leone        +                                     +  
Sen.re Cauda maligno                                                                                                                                               
Inbrogliatore 
              +               +             
Aud.re Baronis malitioso               +                    +             +             
Presid.te Montoliveto                        +      +        +                         
Commiss.io g’n.ale Gabaleone               +                    +    
Gn’ale delle Poste Conterio               +                         +             
Conte Scarnaffigi                      +                 +   
Conte di Piossasco               +        +                  +             
Conte di Masino di gran 
seguito 
         +      +          +                  
Conte Carlo Cacherano        +                            
Conte Perrone                      +          +                    
 
Cav’ri, et Ministri del Piemonte più 
considerabili, che sono, ó, contrarÿ, ó  
favorevoli, contrasignati con la + à 
loro luogo. Tutti gli altri sono buoni 
Piemontesi, che seguiranno il favore 
de Prencipi del Sangue 
Obbedienti a 
Madama 
Disgustati  
da Madama 
Divoti al 
s.r P’npe 
Card’le 
Contrarÿ 
al S’r 
P’npe 
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P’npe 
Tomaso 
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Ponti di Casalgrasso                    +                                                 
Conte Amedeo Benzo            +                         +       
Conte di Gorzegno                      +                                      +           +   
Conte di Montuè                      +                      
Conte Asinaro                              +                                                         
Conte Boeri                +                         
Marchese Mutti                 +          +                               +       
Conte Boetto, uscito di Piem.te                +          +                                     
Marchese di Lulino                                      +                                     
March.e di Bernezzo, avaro 
Gov.re di Nizza 
              +                        +                                     
Conte di Desana                +               +                                    +   
Conte di Muzzano                      +          +                         +           +  
Emanuel di Savoia naturale        +          +                         +           +  
Marchese Giulio Rangoni               +                                     +                         
Frat’lli Vibò segretarÿ               +                  +                     +                        
 
E da notare che la maggior parte de gl’obbedienti à Madama, sono, tali p. timore et che la maggior parte anco degl’Amici delli d’Agliè sono ò p il favore, ò p l’interesse.  E sono in gran numero 
li disgustati da Madama, et che odiano li d’Agliè non descritti in questo foglio, essendo anco in gran numero li divoti de Principi del Sangue frà la Nobiltà, essendo tale la maggior parte del 
Popolo il quale è più adherente à Spagna, che à Francia. 
 
 
